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Barking Dogs: Code Enforcement is All Bark and No
Bite (Unless the Inspectors Have Assault Rifles)
Marilyn L. Uzdavines, J.D.*
1. INTRODUCTION

In Detroit, Michigan, in 2014,1 broken windows, a roof caving in, and a
yard that had not been maintained for years is the view for its residents in a
blighted and unstable neighborhood. Code enforcement inspectors are nowhere
to be found. The local code enforcement department lacks the resources,

manpower, and strategic plan to deal with blight on a massive scale.
In the Antelope Valley, just outside of Los Angeles, on October 17, 2007,
government agents wearing bulletproof vests and armed with assault rifles
surround a cabin. 2 Three men approach the door to the cabin and steel

themselves to execute the job for which they had come. These men are not
there to arrest a drug dealer or apprehend a terrorist. They are there because
3
the cabin did not meet the county building code.
The two paragraphs above paint two very different pictures of real events
in the realm of code enforcement, and neither approach is working to ensure
stable neighborhoods. Local government code enforcement departments are
officials charged with maintaining the health, safety, and welfare of the

community. However, analysis of the code enforcement models used in a
number of communities today shows that they are insufficient to accomplish
the goal of maintaining the health, safety, and welfare of the community. The
spectrum of ineffective code enforcement ranges from the very weak
departments that fail to rehabilitate blighted neighborhoods to the abusive and
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1. Report, DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK FORCE, https://s3.amazonaws.com/detroit-blighttaskforce/CHAPTER+01.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) ("No city in the country has taken on the scale of
blight that Detroit faces.").
2.
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oppressive code enforcement departments that use the code as a tool to further
personal or political agendas.
The first section of this article will begin by briefly explaining the history
of the code enforcement systems that have developed over the last two
centuries. 4 The second section of this article will discuss some of the major
roadblocks that keep the code enforcement departments from being more
effective. In particular, this section will explore how code enforcement
problems have been exacerbated in recent years as a result of the foreclosure
crisis and population migration. Finally, in the third section of this article, I
will highlight proactive solutions that have been extremely effective in
communities that are reforming their code enforcement model to address
community needs-solutions that, I contend, should be extensively replicated.
II.

BACKGROUND OF CODE ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

A. History of Code Enforcement

Historically, one essential duty of government was to protect the property
rights of all its citizens. 5 One method of discharging this duty was by enjoining
nuisances. 6 Along with bringing actions to enjoin nuisances, it was within the
purview of the legislative arm of the government to prescribe what constituted
a nuisance. 7 The legislature also had the power to determine the method for
abating nuisances. 8 The inspectorate had a duty to enjoin public nuisances that
9
interfered with public health, safety, peace, or convenience.
Dating back to the nineteenth century, municipalities in the United States
formed police departments by housing code inspectors, neighborhood watch
programs, and criminal police officers under one roof.'0 Eventually, however,
municipalities separated work of inspectors into separate departments. I I The
focus of the inspectorate was preventative. Its goal was to promote public

4. This article will focus on code enforcement as it relates to residential structures that have already
been built. The issues related to code enforcement of new buildings and of existing commercial properties are
outside the scope of this article.
5. Valdez v. State ex rel. Farrior, 142 Fla. 123, 129 (1940).
6. Id.
7. Examples of activities that states have declared a public nuisance include gambling, maintaining a
house of prostitution, , and public endurance contests continuing longer than twenty-four hours. See Valdez,
142 Fla. at 129 (gambling); People ex rel. Bradford v. Laine, 182 P. 986,988 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919) (prostitution);
Sportatorium, Inc. v. State, 115 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App. 1938) (public endurance contests).
8. "It is also well established that, when a state exerting its recognized authority, undertakes to suppress
what it is free to regard as a public evil, it may adopt such measures having reasonable relation to that end as
it may deem necessary in order to make its action effective." Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S.
192, 201 (1912).
9. Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979) (defining "public nuisance").
10. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law Enforcement for
the Exercise
of Police Discretion, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83 (1984).
11. Id.
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safety. 12 Rather than apprehend criminals to jail them, the emphasis was
preventing violations through community relationships.13
B. Modern Code Enforcement: Three Main Steps in Code Enforcement
Today, there are several remedies for redressing nuisances, including suits
in courts of equity for injunctions, civil actions in courts of law for damages,
and criminal prosecution. States also authorize code enforcement boards to
14
levy fines against those who violate the codes of their jurisdiction.
To be productive, every code enforcement agency must effectively
accomplish three things.' 5 First, it must properly and systematically identify
code violations. 16 Next, it must monitor the properties identified as violating
17
the code, and take the proper action when the problem is not remediated.
Finally, there must be a remediation process, which results in either restoration
or demolition of the problem property. 18
1. Step One: Identifying Code Violations
Looking at the first step of identifying code violations, there are several
methods that are being used throughout the country. Some inspectors use a
periodic inspection approach that is based on a set time cycle. 19 For example,
a "block by block" method would go block by block and inspect every residence
in the community.2 0 While a benefit to this approach is that each property is
included, and the residents feel as though they are being treated equally, a
downside is that it is time consuming and inefficient, and it ignores the fact that
some areas need more attention than others. 2 1 Another method is a
geographically-targeted inspection. The geographically-targeted inspection
method identifies a particular part of a community that has the most problems,
and the inspectors focus their attention on that part of the community. 22 This
may address the neediest areas. However, remaining parts of the community
suffer while all the jurisdiction's resources are being focused on a single area.
Almost all cities use a complaint-based system. The complaint-based
12. Id. at 84.
13. Id.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 162.09 (2004).
15. Phyllis Betts, Best PracticeNumber Ten: Fixing Broken Windows - Strategies to Strengthen Housing
Code Enforcement and Related Approaches to Community-Based Crime Prevention in Memphis (Memphis
Shelby Crime Comm'n, Memphis, TN), April 2001, at 20-21.
16. Id. at 20.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. MARTIN G. COLLINS, THE ART OF CODE ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 27 (2012).

20. Id. at 48.
21. Id. at 28. There are additional methods for identification that can be used that are not included in this
article. For example, some jurisdictions require an inspection scheduled at the time property changes hands to
a new owner. This point of sale inspection is one way of identifying violations, but it is not a comprehensive
strategy to protect the community. Id. at 33.
22.

Id. at 47.
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model becomes a de facto system when no one in authority has developed a
strategy for prioritizing violations. 23 This has the added effect of minimizing
the volume of violations that would be produced under a proactive inspection
system. 24 The complaint-based system may be supplemented by one of the
other methods described above in a more proactive code enforcement
25
department.
A complaint-based system relies on residents who are proactive in
reporting violations. 2 6 "Middle-class residents are more likely to complain
than residents in poorer and more deteriorated neighborhoods and most likely
to get results because they are well enough organized to document violations,
demanding enough to monitor the progress of complaints, and astute enough to
enlist the support of political stakeholders." 2 7 Failure to report violations
creates inspectors who have tacitly accepted the impossibility of total
compliance with the discretion to ignore violations that are not reported despite
being visible to the inspector. 28 The complaint-based model without
combining any additional inspection method is what is primarily used in our
country.

2. Step Two: Monitoring the Identified Violations and Taking Action
a. InformalNotice Policies
The first step taken once the identification method has uncovered a
violation is an informal notice. 2 9 This step has also been referred to as the
advisory notice or the "Ask Nicely" phase. 30 This can include the following:
the inspector placing a telephone call to the owner; a non-threatening letter sent
to the owner letting them know that a violation exists and asking them to
remedy the violation; a door-hanger where the inspector indicates violations
that were observed (such as lawn maintenance, litter, etc.); or an area-wide
advisory letter alerting the residents of a neighborhood that the inspectors are
coming to the neighborhood in a few weeks and giving them suggestions of
common violations that should be fixed so that they can avoid receiving a

23. Betts, supra note 15, at 22-23.
24. Id.
at 22. While there is a rational argument to be made that a complaint-based system is more
efficient and less expensive than a proactive one, in Ross's view the practical goal of the complaint-based
system is to minimize the volume of violations.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 23.
28. Id. In this way code enforcement functions just like criminal law enforcement. Typical strategies
are to focus on cases with a high likelihood of arrest and making the cases unlikely to be solved lower in
priority.
29. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 6, 23; see also id.
at 11.Some jurisdictions that take a stricter approach
will use a "See and Cite" process and immediately cite a violation and bypass this advisory notice phase. This
usually occurs only when the violation poses a significant danger to the community. Id.at 12.
30. Id.
at 23.

2014]

Barking Dogs

formal notice of violation. 3 1 Martin G. Collins, an expert in code enforcement,
states that sixty percent of owners will correct the violation at this first phase
of informal notice. 32 Therefore, finding an informal method to give notice that
33
can be quickly executed and cost-effective is very important.
One informal notice method that has been used in the City of Milwaukee
is the "E-Notify by Location" computer program created by Collins. 34 It makes
use of a free database that keeps records of any change of status to a
"subscribed" property such as a complaint or violation. The subscriber will
receive a direct email that states the status change for a subscribed property.
This allows a subscriber to have immediate notice of a violation. This program
also allows a subscriber to monitor progress of other property violations in their
neighborhood.
b. FormalNotice of Violation
If the informal notice described above does not yield the desired
compliance, the next phase is generally a formal notice of violation. 35 The
formal notice of violation is a legal notice that must be given once enforcement
of the code violation has begun. 36 The violator needs to be given adequate
notice of the violation, and included in the notice, must be the specific
references to the code that has been violated and penalties that may result if
compliance is not achieved. 37 The formal notice of violation will also contain
a time frame in which the violator has to comply before the next phase of
enforcement is initiated. 38 Each local jurisdiction has specific procedures,
dictated by law, that local officials must adhere to when they implement the
requirement-procedures that must be followed closely to avoid due process
violations.
c. The Reinspection
When the time period listed in the formal notice of violation has expired,
the inspector will set a time to reinspect the property to determine if the owner
has remedied the violation. 3 9 The inspector may make phone calls to check in
31. Id.
32. Id. at 25. Martin G. Collins is regarded as one of the leading influencers in code enforcement. He
has been employed in the Counsel's Office of New York City's Department of City Planning. He has held the
positions of Code Enforcement Administrator, followed by Construction Inspection Administrator, Deputy
Commissioner, and Commissioner for Milwaukee's Building Inspection Department, n/k/a Department of
Neighborhood Services. From 1984 through 2011, Mr. Collins annually taught Existing Housing Inspection
Administration and Management at UW-Madison's Annual Professional Development Program's Housing and
Building Inspection.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 26.
35. Id. at 47.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id. at 56.
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with the owner before the time to correct the violation has expired. Working
with the owner to help with questions the owner may have about what is needed
to bring the property into compliance demonstrates that the inspector's goal is
rehabilitation of the property and not punishment of the owner. 40 Beyond the
first sixty percent of violators who comply at the informal notice stage, another
thirty percent typically comply during the formal notice stage by the time of
41
their first or second reinspection.
d. Pre-CourtHearingAlternative
If the formal notice of violation and reinspection period do not result in
compliance, many jurisdictions will move to the stage where a court or hearing
officer hears the case and, potentially, issues a sanction. 42 However, some
jurisdictions that take a softer approach include the additional step of the "pre'court hearing altemative." 4 3 This approach gives the violator one last chance
to enter into an agreement with the inspector to comply with the code and avoid
court and the ensuing sanctions. 44 The pre-court hearing allows the owner to
meet with the inspector or a pre-court officer at a specified time and date and
tell his or her side of the story before being brought before the court.4 5 The
46
inspector will then determine whether a final extension period is warranted.
If the owner is given an additional extension period and complies with the code,
the case ends.4 7 However, if the owner still does not comply after the expiration
of this additional time period, the case proceeds forward to court. 4 8 Some
jurisdictions also use mediation during this phase immediately before court.
However, as is also true of the pre-court hearing, mandatory mediation
increases the time it takes to bring a case to completion.
e. Taking the Case to Court
If the informal notice, formal notice of violation, reinspection period, and
pre-court hearing or mediation has failed to motivate the owner to remedy the

40. See id. Even if this goal is not codified, local governments desire the removal of blight over
delivering punishment to individuals. For example, in a brochure published by the Los Alamos County, New
Mexico, Community & Economic Development Department, the Code Enforcement Division states, "[tihe
goal of Code Enforcement is compliance not punishment."

Nuisance and Property Maintenance Code

Information, LOS ALAMOS CNTY. (2014), https://www.losalamosnm.us/cdd/Documents/2014 08 19%20
Nuisance%2OCode%20Brochure alaurent.pdf.
41. See Collins, supra note 19 at 25. Extension policies can be given at the reinspection period to allow
the owner additional time to bring the property into compliance. Id. at 57. However, code enforcement
departments would be wise to adopt rules as to what qualifies a property for an extension so that the various
inspectors in one department are treating violators consistently in their enforcement efforts. Id.
42. Id.
at 60.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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violation, the owner will have to appear at a judicial or quasi-judicial hearing
regarding the violation.4 9 For the cases that result in a court hearing, the
inspectors will have to testify as to the condition of the property and the steps
taken to remedy the violation. 50 The owner may then introduce rebuttal
evidence. Ultimately, the judge will determine what, if any, remedy is
appropriate for the defendant. 5 1 Some of the remedies discussed in the
paragraph below can occur at the completion of the court hearing. Others can
52
be used earlier in the process to encourage compliance before court.
Various types of deterrence tools or "hammers" can be used to encourage
prompt action and, in each jurisdiction, local and state laws will dictate which
legal tools are available. 5 3 Some of the "hammers" that have been effective in
producing desired actions by non-compliant owners include fines, physically
removing the violation or nuisance, 54 allowing easy public access to code
violation records, 55 code enforcement through cost recovery reinspection
fees, 56 civil court injunction, and potential contempt of court resulting in power
59
58
to arrest for noncompliance, 57 criminal sanctions, and monthly case fees.

An additional "hammer" can be a lien placed on the property to recoup fees
spent to abate a nuisance. 60 In some jurisdictions, these liens can be very
61
effective and result in forfeiture of the property.
49. Id. at 67. Some local governments have established administrative proceedings to review code
enforcement claims. This alleviates some of the case load for the civil and criminal courts. One example is
Riverside, California, which has established a notice, hearing, and appeal procedure in lieu of formal court
proceedings.

See

RIVERSIDE

MUNICIPAL

CODE,

§§

1.17.005-1.17.390,

available

at

http://www.riversideca.gov/municode/pdf/01/1 -17.pdf.
50. Collins, supra note 19 at 68.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 61.
54. Id. at 62-63. Abatement of the nuisance may be limited to only apply to exterior violations such as
weed-cutting, junk cars, etc. Other jurisdictions may allow the abatement of violations actually within the
home such as emergency heating repairs.
55. Id. at 63. This type of hammer motivates the individuals that are not deterred by fines, but are
concerned about their public reputation. In addition to making the public records of violations easily accessible,
local jurisdictions could even have the legal right to post large visible signs on the offending property or even
hold press conferences in front of the property. This hammer should be used with caution as one of the last
resorts.
56. Id. Reinspection fees could be a flat fee for each reinpspection, or graduated fees that increase with
each inspection.
57. Id. at 66. This is another powerful hammer that should be saved for the most egregious of cases after
the department has all the facts of why the owner is not complying. Sometimes the owner is not complying
due to financial hardship or medical problems, and the inspector would be wise to direct the owner to places
for assistance as opposed to seeking jail time for failing to comply with the court injunction. Id. at 24, 60.
58. Id. at 67. Some jurisdictions allow this, while many do not. New York City used to have criminal
sanctions for code violations. Id. ("Picture the judge who hada docket of cases for murder, aggravated assault,
rape and then one for peeling paint. This pretty much sums up why New York switched from a criminal to a
civil sanction method for enforcing the code.").
59. Id. Portland, Oregon has used this method as a hammer. The inspector opens a case with each
violation and there is a monthly ease fee that begins at the formal notice of violation stage that the violator is
legally responsible to pay each month the case is open until the inspector has verified that the property is in
compliance. This can encourage prompt action by the owner so that the monthly fees stop accruing. Id.
60. Id. at 61.
61. Id. at 69. Code enforcement liens will be discussed in more detail in Part III and Part IV of this
article.
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3. Step Three: Restoration or Demolition
Local law, the inspector's assessment of the danger an offending property
poses to the inhabitants or surrounding neighbors, the value of the property, and
the owner's willingness to comply with the court order all play a part in
determining whether a non-compliant house should be restored or
demolished. 62 A threat of condemnation and demolition may be the ultimate
motivator for some homeowners. 63 Demolition, however, takes significant
financial resources. 64 The average cost of a demolition is approximately
$10,000.65 Many times the value of the home is far below the cost to demolish
66
the home.

III. PROBLEMS IN CODE ENFORCEMENT
Because code enforcement is implemented at the local level, each
community may face its own unique challenges to maintaining properties.
There are some problems, however, that are common to many communities
throughout the United States that are dealing with a rise of vacant and
abandoned homes due to financial or natural disasters. There are also some
communities that have faced code enforcement problems due to an overly
aggressive code enforcement system. It is important to address this problem of
abuse as well because, although it is not as widespread, the effects are equally
devastating on a community.
This Part of the article will highlight several of these common problems.
First, this Part will discuss the lack of resources that hinder a code enforcement
agency from effectively doing its job. Next, this Part will discuss how a
standard code enforcement lien does not assist in encouraging a homeowner's
compliance or recouping the local government's remediation fees. Then, this
Part will discuss problems with the drafting of the codes that make the codes
inherently unenforceable due to vague language, an unattainable middle class
standard, and a lack of prioritization of goals. Next, this Part will discuss how
the current practice of targeting the property owner is ineffective and belies the
main purpose of code enforcement, which is to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens. Finally, this Part will discuss the problem of abusive
62. See id at 67.
63. Id.
64. See Report, DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK FORCE, https://s3.amazonaws.com/detroit-blight-

taskforce/CHAPTER+01.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). The task force, assembled by the Obama
administration, reported that about 40,000 homes must be demolished and thousands more rehabilitated.
"Detroit will need as much as $850 million just to address neighborhood blight in the next few years." Id.
65.

Why Does it Take so Long to Demolish an Abandoned Building, DETROIT 2020 (May 17, 2012),

http://detroit2020.com/2012/05/17/why-does-it-take-so-long-to-demolish-an-abandoned-building/;

see also

Leila Atassi, Cleveland's Glut of Vacant Housing Could Cost Billions to Eliminate at Current Pace,
CLEVELAND
PLAIN
DEALER
(Sept.
25,
2011),

http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ss f/2012/09/clevelandsglut of vacant hous.html.
66. Graham Wood, Home Demolition Costs in Detroit Exceed Property's Value in Many Cases (Feb. 4,

2013), http://realestate.aol.com/blog/20 13/02/04/detroit-demolition-home-values/.
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code enforcement departments, and it will highlight communities that have
been subjected to this type of aggressive code enforcement.
A. Lack ofResources
Whether it was caused by an economic downturn or a natural disaster, a
shockingly large number of America's communities are dealing with blight on
a massive scale. 67 However, in an environment where the budgets are shrinking
and the workload is increasing, code enforcement is struggling to keep up with
the needs of the changing communities. Very often code enforcement
departments fail to meet intended goals, a problem that is exacerbated68by the
perception that too few resources exist to adequately enforce the code.
The local ad valorem property tax is the main source of revenue for most
code enforcement departments. 69 As a result of the increased numbers of
vacant and abandoned properties in our country, the stream of revenue from
property taxes is often delayed because of tax or lender foreclosures. It may
take years before the local jurisdiction receives payment of the tax arrearages
on foreclosed properties. 70 Although there may eventually be a payment of all
the tax arrearages, foreclosure-caused delays often disturb the revenue needed
to pay local code enforcement department salaries and costs. 7 1 Moreover, the
workload for code inspectors has increased because of the increased numbers
of homes that are either vacant, abandoned, or not being maintained while they
are in foreclosure. 72 In many areas, the local jurisdictions have been unable to
73
create additional revenue sources to keep up with the community needs.
There are numerous communities in which local governments have only
one or two individuals available to handle the entire code enforcement within
the jurisdiction. This tiny staff is responsible for identifying code violations,
67. See Allison Blyer and Elaine Ortiz, Benchmarksfor Blight How Much Blight Does New Orleans
Have?, GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMTY. CTR., 4 (Aug. 21, 2012),

A study of
https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/GNOCDCBenchmarksForBlightMarch2Ol2.pdf.
blight in New Orleans published by the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center looked at the rate of
blight in other cities as of March 2012. Id. It found that Detroit had 83,833 blighted houses (24% ofthe city's
houses), Flint, Michigan had 14,497 (27%), Youngstown, Ohio had 7,057 (2 1%), Cleveland had 40,824 (19%),
and Baltimore had 40,265 (14%). Id. According to the study's estimates, New Orleans had 43,680 (21%),
down from 71,657 (34%) in March 2008. Id.Based on the study, the cities listed all have seen rises in blight,
except New Orleans. Id. Much of New Orleans's success is due to changes in their code enforcement system
and a superlien statute in Louisiana, which is discussed below. Id.
68. Betts, supra note 15, at 27.
69. See COLLINS, supra note, at 70.

70. Frank S.Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 748 (2000) (citing
Henry J. Aaron, Who Pays the Property Tax?: A New View 56 (1975)). In addition to the time involved in
foreclosing tax liens, the process is complicated, and sometimes costly. Id. "Collection of delinquent property
taxes is not for the faint hearted." Id.
71. Id. The property tax, as a percentage of overall revenue, "continues to be predominant among the
sources of revenue that are within the control of our cities, counties, and school districts." Id.
72. See COLLINS, supranote 19 at 69." 'Do more with less!' has been the guiding motto and has resulted
in many creative approaches to achieving the goals of code enforcement." Id.
73.

See Matt Johnson, Understaffed Code Enforcement, KXXV-TV NEWS CHANNEL 25 (Mar. 21, 2011,

8:12 PM)
future.

http://www.kxxv.com/story/14294297/understaffed-code-enforcement-department-key-to-citys-

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 54

investigating reported violations, citing the violations, monitoring compliance,
and overseeing the rehabilitation of the property. The situation in Killeen,
Texas provides a useful illustration of just how understaffed code enforcement
offices frequently are. As of March, 2011, Killeen, which has an estimated
population of 130,000 people, employed two code enforcement officers who
were responsible for handling over 200 cases per month. 74 The responsibilities
of these two officials were increased to require them to remove worn-down
signage and solid waste. Nonetheless, the City did not hire more staff
members. 75 As a result, one resident reported trash in Killeen, such as old
mattresses, now remains left out in the neighborhood for as long as three
76
weeks.
Other examples abound. In Lexington, Kentucky the population exceeds
300,000, and yet there are only two staff members to address code enforcement
78
issues. 77 In Cincinnati, Ohio, one inspector had a caseload of 600 properties.
Billings, Montana employed five code enforcement staff members, and
documented 1,662 violations between January and June, 2013. 79 Cleveland,
Ohio, and Detroit, Michigan, have both cut their code enforcement personnel
in half since the mid-2000s during a period when the number of abandoned
80
homes has dramatically increased.
One key to keeping a code enforcement staff functional during this tough
housing market is to add additional revenue sources that can supplement the
revenue that is received from the property tax. 8 1 Additional revenue can come
in the form of fees, fines, grants, and recovery costs. 82 One such fee is the
reinspection fee. 83 Each time an inspector has to go to a property to reinspect
and determine whether the property is in compliance, the owner can be charged
a fee. 84 Another fee that can be used to create revenue is the point of sale
inspection fees. 85 This is a program where the inspector inspects a property
that is about to be sold. The inspector then charges a fee for this service, which
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lexington-Fayette, KYProfle, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/Lexington-Fayette-

Kentucky.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2014) (listing the population of Lexington).
78.

Kevin Lemaster, SchoenbergerSays B&l Understaffed,BUILDING CINCINNATI (Dec. 27, 2007, 12:17

AM) http://www.building-cincinnati.com/2007/12/schoenberger-says-b-understaffed.html.
79. City Code Enforcement Staff Directory, CITY OF BILLINGS, MT-OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://ci.billings.mt.us/Directory.aspx?DID=5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); City Code Enforcement Monthly
Report, CITY OF BILLINGS, MT-OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://ci.billings.mt.us/DocumentCenterfView/23202 (last

visited Nov. 16, 2014).
80. Jeremy

Liu,

The

New

Age

of Code

Enforcement,

ROOFLINES

(Apr.

8,

2013),

http://www.rooflines.org/3181/the-new-ageof code enforcement/; U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO- 12-34, Vacant Properties: Growing Number Increases Communities' Costs and Challenges 47 (2011).
81. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 70.
82. Id. at 70-71 ; see also Alexander, supra note 70, at 748.
83. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 70.
84. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 57; see Rusk v. City of Milwaukee, 727 N.W.2d 358, 364 (Wis. 2006).
85. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 71; CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF BEDFORD, OHIO § 1311.18,

(Oct. 5, 2008), available at http:llwhdrane.conwaygreene.com/NXT/gateway.dll?f-templates&fn=
default.htm&vid=whdrane:OHBedford.
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also alerts the potential buyer to code violations before closing on the property.
Additional revenue sources may also be generated from the recovery costs
expended to abate a violation. 8 6 For example, demolition costs may be
recoverable from fire insurance proceeds. 8 7 If the state has created a fire
insurance escrow fund, this fund will allow the code enforcement department
to receive insurance proceeds to pay for the demolition of a building partially
destroyed by fire. 88 The property owner is prevented from pocketing the
insurance proceeds while the taxpayers pay the bill for the demolition. 89 Fines
are another way to generate additional resources for code enforcement
90
departments.
Some jurisdictions use fines heavily to encourage compliance and deter
violations. 9 1 However, as discussed in more detail below, code enforcement
departments should tread cautiously with creating fines and other penalties that
create a risk that the owner will face criminal sanctions if he or she does not
pay. The focus should be on the property and not the person, and recovering
the property to rehabilitate it should take precedence over fining the owner to
raise revenue. There should be a careful balance between the need to create
additional revenue streams and the need to protect citizens from criminal
sanctions and incarceration because of fines that are not paid on code violations.
B. Liens Do Not Protect the Local Government

Another sort of code enforcement problem arises when a properly
enforced code still results in blighted communities. Typically, at its
penultimate point, code enforcement involves placing a lien on the delinquent
property for fines levied and costs that were incurred by the authority placing
the lien. The final enforcement step, in theory, is foreclosing that lien, forcing
a sale to the highest bidder, or-failing any meaningful bids-taking
possession of the property in satisfaction of the lien. The authority then has the
power to remediate any deficiencies that remain on the property, and then sell
it to recoup its expenses.
The goal, of course, is that the process never reaches the foreclosure stage.
A municipality's power to lien and foreclose code enforcement liens is
designed to encourage the property owner or any mortgage holders to remediate
the code violations on the property and pay any fines or expenses. When
property owners held equity in their land, this was generally effective. 92 Today,
86. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 71.
87. id. at 72.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. For example, in Daly City, California, constructing a secondary unit on a home without a
permit results in a $1,050 fine if not corrected within 90 days. Code Enforcement Procedures and Fees,
DALYCITY.ORG, http://www.dalycity.org/Pagel95.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
92. An owner holds equity in their property when its value exceeds the total value of the liens that exist
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since many distressed properties are valued below what the owner owes to
mortgage holders, the threat of a code enforcement lien loses its sting. 9 3 This
is a problem because the owner has no fear of losing equity in the property as a
result of the junior lien, and the local government has no incentive to foreclose
the lien to recoup costs because there is not enough equity in the property
relative to their lien priority.
C. Current Codes as DraftedAre Inherently Unenforceable
Most codes are currently drafted in a manner that makes them inherently
unenforceable. 94 Some codes are drafted in vague terms that do not give
objective guidelines for an inspector to implement. Other codes are drafted to
require homes to maintain a middle class standard that is idealistic and
impossible to maintain in lower income neighborhoods. Additionally, most
codes fail to set priorities for code enforcement departments, leaving inspectors
to set their own priorities of which violations to enforce. These shortcomings
in the code should be addressed to achieve higher success in code compliance.
1. The Code is Drafted for a Middle Class Standard and is Vague
Almost all housing codes define a standard that is of middle-class
quality. 95 However, not all properties can feasibly meet the required standard,
especially much needed, affordable rental properties. 96 For example, a code
that requires all dwellings to use premium quality paint or modem standards of
lighting may prevent some units from being affordable in the lower income
market. 97 If an owner must put in thousands of dollars to bring an older
dwelling into compliance with requirements that are not necessarily essential,
then the owner will have to raise the rent to make it economically feasible to
rent the unit. 9 8 This will drive the prices of rental units up and prevent lower
income families from finding affordable housing. 99 Moreover, codes are also
often voluminous and vague. "They may require, for example, 'good repair,'

upon it. When property values plummeted in the late 2000's, many owners who held equity in their properties
found themselves with mortgage debt that exceeded those new values. Subsequent lienholders, like code
enforcement agencies, found that their liens were essentially worthless.
93. When a junior lienholder holds a lien on a property whose owner still has equity in it,
the lienholder
has the possibility of 1) the owner paying the lien, because they do not want to lose the equity they have in the
property, or 2) foreclosing the lien, because even though the junior lienholder cannot extinguish the senior
liens, the value of the property will allow the junior lienholder to either sell the property to satisfy the senior
liens, or justify satisfying or negotiating the senior liens directly.
94. Betts, supra note 15, at 21.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Id. (citing H.

Lawrence Ross, Underenforcing the Housing Code, http://www.reds.msh-

paris.fr/communication/textes/hcode.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2014)). Although we know that most city codes
share this standard (for example properties free of cracks in the walls), we also know that it is unrealistic to
meet each and every demand for multifamily rental properties atthe bottom of the rental market. Id.
97. See Betts, supra note 15, at 22.
98. See id.

99. See id.
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'safe condition,' or 'fitness for human habitation,' " terms that are not selfdefining and provide owners with inadequate notice of what is required of
100
them.
2. Current Codes Fail to Address the Prioritization of Goals
It is also unrealistic to think that even if every single code violation in a
particular city could be identified, the code enforcement authorities would have
the resources and manpower to deal with them all. 101 This impossibility may
10 2
lead to a lack of commitment by those working in code enforcement.
Moreover, the law itself does not usually establish priorities for code
enforcement departments, and departmental management, too, often refuses to
set priorities. 10 3 Thus, inspectors must often set their own priorities of which
violations to enforce. 10 4 This is a flawed system. Individual judgment rarely
utilizes the benefit of the collective wisdom that a comprehensive strategy
developed by a code enforcement agency would afford. 10 5 Without a clear
strategy to prioritize violations, it is easier for individual inspectors to be biased
in their enforcement. It is easier for them to avoid more dangerous violations,
which take more work and are harder to resolve, so that they can show a better
106
success rate by selecting easier violations to enforce.
Another pitfall that occurs when there is no clear prioritization is that code
enforcement departments focus on "impression management."' 10 7 When a
department begins to focus on particularly high profile violations, "impression
108
management displaces enforcement as the primary function of the system."'
The result is a department that places misguided stock in particular compliance
victories rather than the overall effectiveness of the department in actually
eradicating and preventing blight. 10 9 The ultimate effect of an impression
management oriented strategy is a code enforcement department with
underdeveloped systems for the essential prerequisites for an efficient
department. 110
100. Id.
101.

See id.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.As we see any time an individual is required to exercise personal judgment interpreting law, the
results are varied. An inspector may decide to enforce the code against a violator because compliance can be
obtained more easily, but could also be based on personal reasons such as whether a particular violator has
been disrespectful.
105. Id.Relying on the personal judgment of an individual inspector also can result in inconsistent
enforcement and claims of selective enforcement which frustrate the community by confusing expectations.
Id.
106. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 81.
107. Betts, supra note 15, at 23. "Impression management means that more highly visible or more
politically significant complaints become priorities, including both serious health and safety complaints and
complaints involving influential stakeholders." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
at 23-24.
110. Id.at24.
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D. Code Enforcement's Focus on the Person and Not on the Property
To enforce its code, two types of actions are available to a local
government: in personam and in rem. In personam actions include fines and
penalties, I l and can even involve civil contempt of court. 112 In rem actions
are those that look to the property for satisfaction. 113 A code enforcement lien
against property securing the costs of remediating code violations is considered
in rem. 1 14 Both types of actions benefit local government in their code
enforcement work. However, there are limitations to each. In personam
actions may encourage some property owners into compliance, but not all.
Some property owners have no resources to pay fines or cover the costs of

remediation; in these cases, in personam actions carry little weight. 115 In rem
actions, such as placing liens and foreclosing on the property, avoid the pitfalls
of insolvent property owners. 116 But they come with their own obstacles. As
noted above, a problem local governments face with their code enforcement
liens is that often the property value is less than the existing liens. As a result,
it frequently makes little financial sense for the local government to foreclose
its lien, 117 and in a lender foreclosure, there will likely be no surplus to pay the
local government's junior lien.
In many instances, there is post-adjudication non-compliance. 118 This
occurs when a judge or hearing officer has determined an individual is in
violation, yet the violator still does not abate the nuisance. 119 Of course, the in
rem penalties described above such as liens on the property could result in
forfeiture of the property. 120 However, in some jurisdictions the code violation
can result in incarceration. 12 1 This seems very wrong. An in personam action
111. "In an effort to achieve compliance with local laws, ordinances and building and zoning codes, local
municipalities can obtain leverage against accused parties by seeking the imposition of cumulative fines for
continuing violations." Desmond C.B. Lyons, Esq., Building the Pyramid: The Use of Cumulative Penalties
in Municipal Code Prosecutions, 36 WESTCHESTER B.J. 38, 38 (2009).
112. Black's Law Dictionary defines inpersonam as "I. Involving or determining the personal rights and
obligations of the parties. 2. (Ofa legal action) brought against a person rather than property." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009).
113. Black's Law Dictionary defines in rem as "Involving or determining the status of a thing, and
therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (9th ed.
2009).
114. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D LIENS Jurisdictionand venue; foreclosures as proceedingsin rem § 84 (2011).
115. Fines and penalties that are uncollectable due to a property owner's insolvency are ultimately a waste
of resources for the local government, in that the process to levy the fines uses money and manpower that could
be used in more productive ways. In addition, jailing property owners who cannot or will not comply still does
not accomplish code enforcement's ultimate goal - restoration.
116. For a detailed discussed on the benefits of pursuing in rem remedies with vacant houses, see Kelly.
James J. Jr., A Continuum In Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Houses to the Market, SCHOLARLY WORKS
(2013), http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law-faculty scholarship/108.
117. This is because the local government's foreclosure, as a junior lienholder, would not extinguish the
senior liens, so the local government would take title subject to all superior liens.
118. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 68.
119. Id.
120. Seeid. at69.
121. Paul Nelson, Week In Jail for Code Violations, TIMES UNION (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.timesunion.com/local/articlefWeek-in-jail-for-code-violations-4840772.php.
For example, in
Schenectady, New York, a man was sentenced to a week in jail for failure to pay code enforcement fines. Id.
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against the violator could result in a court order to repair the property and then
the use of contempt of court penalties could ultimately lead to the violator's
incarceration. 122 In the case where the violator simply does not have the
financial means to make the repair, this essentially results in a debtor's
prison. 12 3 Although the United States Constitution does not allow a person to
124
be incarcerated simply because he or she is unable to pay fines or court costs,
some courts circumvent that mandate by using civil contempt as a means to
incarcerate the violator. 125 The Great Recession has left many people in the
position where they cannot afford to maintain their homes, they are fined for
code violations, they are not able to make the repairs, and they are hit with
additional fines, and then jailed for contempt of court when they do not comply
with the court order to remedy the violations. 126 To make matters worse, a
violator in foreclosure can face a more difficult situation when he or she is still
the legal owner of the property and the bank is stalling the foreclosure. If cost
of the foreclosure and fines on the property would outweigh what the bank
would receive from the collateral, the bank has no incentive to move forward
with the foreclosure litigation. 127 This results in a home that the owner cannot
afford to keep or maintain, and a lender who is contending that because they
are not the owner, they do not have a responsibility to comply with the code
enforcement order to make the repairs. In this case, the house sits in disrepair
with no one willing to pay to rehabilitate the property, and the community at
large is victimized. 128 Much of the blight that we see in communities today is
a result of this dodging of responsibility between the homeowner and the
foreclosing lender.
The following is anecdotal evidence of the dangers of In Personam
Enforcement. The system is broken when you hear of a single mother pleading
to a judge to grant a motion for summary judgment of foreclosure against her
so that she will not have to go to jail for failing to repair a damaged roof. A
former client's situation illustrates how hard it can be for a homeowner without
the means to repair a code violation. Sandy, 129 a single mother, had a house in
foreclosure for over five years. Sandy's house was valued well below the

The prosecutor in that matter sought the maximum sentence of ninety days. Id.
122.

COLLINS, supra note 19, at 68; see also Paul Nelson, Week In Jailfor Code Violations, TIMES UNION

(Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Week-in-jail-for-code-violations-4840772.php.
123. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,240 (1970).
124. See id. at241;Tatev. Short, 401 U.S. 395,398(1971).
125. See Letter From Christine Link, Exec. Dir. of ACLU of Ohio, to Hon. Chief Justice Maureen
O'Connor, Supreme Ct. Justice. (Apr. 2013). The letter discussed the emergence of a debtor's prison in Ohio,
which blatantly disregarded the U.S. Supreme Court, Constitution, and the Ohio constitution. Id. A person is
not permitted to be incarcerated for failing to pay a fine if they are unable to do so. Id. A hearing to determine
the violator's financial status and ability to pay must be heard before a person is incarcerated. Id.
126. See COLLINS, supra note 19, at 69.
127. See Kermit J. Lind, CollateralMatters: Housing Code Compliance in the Mortgage Crisis, 32 N.

ILL. U. L. REV. 445, 454 (2012).
128. Id. at449--450.
129. The homeowner's name has been changed to protect the privacy of the individual.
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amount that was owed on the property. Two years into the foreclosure, while
Sandy was still residing in the house, the roof was damaged due to a strong
storm. Sandy's homeowner's insurance would not give Sandy the money to
repair the roof because the home was in foreclosure. Her lender would not
repair the roof, and she could not afford to repair the roof. The local code
enforcement department gave Sandy several notices to repair the roof. Each
time she spoke with the inspector, she told him that she did not have money to
repair the roof and the insurance company and lender were not working with
her to fix it. After months of notices, Sandy's case was heard in court and the
court issued an order requiring her to repair the roof. Sandy received the order,
along with the inspector's warning that if she did not repair it, she could be
incarcerated. Sandy explained to the inspector that she had no money to fix it
and that her house was in foreclosure. Sandy could not risk being incarcerated
as she was the sole provider in the household, and she had no one else who
could care for her young son.
Sandy was a paralegal and knew enough about litigation to set a hearing
date for the motion for summary judgment for the foreclosure of her own home.
Sandy set the hearing. The lender's counsel did not appear and Sandy argued
in support of the lender that the court should grant the motion for summary
judgment and set a sale date. She was desperate to get the property out of her
name so that she would not be responsible for the repair of the roof. Sandy
represented herself pro se at the motion for summary judgment hearing.13 0 The
motion for summary judgment was granted and in a few months the lender took
title at the foreclosure sale. If a homeowner in Sandy's circumstances did not
know enough about the law to move the foreclosure to a sale, as Sandy did, that
owner could have eventually been incarcerated.
The code enforcement's attempt at compliance through the threat of
incarceration was not successful in this case. Solutions that would have
benefitted the community, without threatening incarceration of a woman
financially incapable of compliance, are discussed in Part Four of this article.
E. Unchecked andAbusive Code Enforcement Departments

In some areas of our country, code enforcement has been used as a
cannonball where a simple flyswatter would suffice. Cases from the Antelope
Valley in California, and Arlington, Texas, highlight the potential abuse that
nuisance abatement teams can administer. The people of Antelope Valley who
are "off the grid" are least able to defend themselves in these cases yet they are
most in need.
130. Although it is outside the scope of this article, it is interesting to explore the rights of an individual

facing a debtor's prison and whether or not they are afforded the right to counsel if they cannot afford one. See
Travis Steams, Legal Financial Obligations:Fulfilling the Promise of Gideon by Reducing the Burden, 11
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 963, 984 (2013).
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The Antelope Valley is a 2,200 square mile patch of land located at the
western edge of the Mojave Desert in Los Angeles County. 13 1 It is made up of
small towns with residents ranging from truck drivers to retirees. 132 The
common thread between most of the residents is the desire to live somewhere
quiet and to be left alone. 133 But the scene described in the introduction of this
article, with armed, flak jacket-wearing agents descending on homes in the
Valley has become a story told by more and more residents since 2006.
On October 17, 2007, the agents surrounded a cabin belonging to Jacques
and Marcelle Dupuis. The cabin they lived in stood for twenty-six years
without incident. But the agents told Marcelle that because the structure did
not have the proper permits, it would have to be torn down. Jacques had built
the cabin to code in 1984, but he did not obtain the proper permits at the time.
As an experienced commercial builder, he assumed he could get the permits
after the fact, a common practice in Southern California. "They wouldn't let
me grandfather in the water tank," Jacques Dupuis said. 134 "It is so heartwrenching because there was a way to salvage this, but they wouldn't work
with me. It was, 'Tear it down. Period.' -135
In another manifestation of the aggressive tactics of the Antelope Valley
Nuisance Abatement Team ("NAT"), Oscar Castaneda, a pastor of a historic
Seventh-day Adventist Church, was ordered to "freeze" while walking on his
own remote rural property. 136 Having received verbal approval from the
county decades ago for his improvements, Castaneda told the NAT team that
in twenty-two years no one had ever bothered him. 137 The NAT team member
replied, "Well, we're twenty-two years late." 138 Castaneda and his wife gave
up the fight and moved off of the land they had lived on for twenty-two years.
Scott Sterner, another Antelope Valley resident, was also a victim of the
NAT's ruthless policies. 139 The armed NAT team came after Sterner who had
two seagoing containers on his property. 14 0 To comply with the code, Sterner
was forced to cut the containers into three pieces with a blowtorch. 14 1 His
property now meets code but he has a worthless and potentially dangerous mess
142
in his yard.
131. Melnicoff, supra note 2.
132.

Tim Cavanaugh, Celebratethe Freedomto Have Your Life Destroyed by County Busybodies, HIT &

RUN: REASON.COM (July 4, 2011,7:49 PM) http://reason.com/blog/2011/07/04/celebrate-the-freedom-to-have,
133. Id.
134. See Melnicoff, supra note 2.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. Sterner's neighbors also had containers of the same kind. Id.
141. Id. The local code prohibited non-permitted structures larger than 120 square feet on private
property. Id.
142. Id. Residents discovered information that the third party complaints to the NAT team were all coming
from the same party, and this was a wealthy investor looking to build condos in this area. Id. Various
conspiracy theories as to why there is a focus on this rural area of Los Angeles County exist. Id.
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A six-week investigation by L.A. Weekly in 2011 found that the NAT team
was "pursuing victimless misdemeanors and code violations, with sometimes
tragic results."' 14 3 Los Angeles County officials state that the NAT team is used
only for "[v]ery, very serious violations," however; some residents who appear
to be doing no harm and have lived on the land for decades are being left
homeless. 144 Key members of the NAT team admitted there is now a major
focus on the unincorporated areas of the Antelope Valley. 145
Robert
McNamara, an attorney at the Institute of Justice, states that inevitably,
selective enforcement of the code occurs. 146 Technically, everyone is in
violation of some code, so a code enforcement team can pick on the people they
147
do not like, and there is little judicial oversight to prevent this abuse.
Another incident that received media attention occurred in Arlington,
Texas. This incident occurred at a property dubbed "The Garden of Eden," a
combined business and residence that promoted a self-sufficient lifestyle. On
August 2, 2013, the Arlington code enforcement team, along with a SWAT
team, raided the premises. The SWAT team was there to execute a search for
marijuana plants, none of which were found. The code enforcement team
hauled away compost and furniture, along with goods that were essential to the
48
residents' daily lives. 1
This Texas case, along with those from the Antelope Valley, highlight the
difficulty code enforcement agencies face in balancing protection of the
community with individual rights. In the "Garden of Eden" incident, the police
allegedly received multiple complaints that the owners were growing marijuana
plants on the property. 149 Prior to the August 2, 2013 raid, the owners of the
property had already been cited with a Nuisance Abatement Order for
violations.
This case raises several issues in defining effective code
enforcement procedures.
First, when operating under a complaint-based system, agencies are stuck
between taking a complaint at face value and making judgment calls assessing
their reliability. Investigating every complaint will invariably spend resources
on some false leads. Yet ignoring some complaints might overlook genuine
violations. Second, the reality is that virtually every property has some
violation that could be remediated. The agencies must ask which violations

143. Id.
144. Id.
145.

Id.

146. Id.
147.

See id.

148. Owner, Shellie Smith, explained, "There were 15 to 20 blackberry bushes. There were sunflowers
for our bees and gifting. Lots of okra, and we had a sweet potato patch that they whacked down with a WeedEater.. .The weeds that we used to shade our crops are also gone." Liz Klimas, Texas 'Garden of Eden' Owner
Claims SWA T RaidedHer Property Under "Guise'of a Drug Bust and Took 20,420 Pounds of Material, THE
BLAZE, (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:36 AM) http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/08/16/texas-garden-of-eden-owner-

claims-swat-raided-her-property-under-guise-of-a-drug-bust-and-took-20420-pounds-f-materia.
149. Id.
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should be enforced to further the overall purpose of code enforcement. They
must exercise sound judgment. One might be hard pressed to argue that
removing blackberry bushes furthers the goal of community preservation and
safety. Unfortunately, the typical explanation is one that sounds in a zerotolerance attitude, that is, if it is a violation, then enforcement is justified. This
mentality drives a wedge between the community and code enforcement
agencies, and does inspectors the disservice of implying that they lack the
common sense to distinguish between a garden with edible plants and a house
1 50
overgrown with weeds.
An additional factor that complicates a code enforcement agency's
decision is the demographic of the violator. There are a variety of factors that
are at work in every anecdote of an agency enforcing its code, including age,
income level, and ethnicity. The problem for code enforcement is that a hazard
on a young, wealthy couple's property poses the same danger to the community
as one on a poor, elderly widow's property. Yet social sympathy will favor the
widow and call code enforcement oppressive, while the wealthy couple may be
viewed as degenerates for not keeping their property in compliance. This issue
is evident in a case from La Quinta, California.
Ageda Camargo, an eighty-three-year-old woman, bought a home in La
Quinta in 1977.151 The house came with three bedrooms, and she lived there
peacefully for thirty years. 152 On June 7, 2007, code enforcement inspectors
found that one of her three bedrooms was actually a garage converted into a
room, in violation of the code. 153 The court agreed, fining Camargo $3,000,
which she stated she could not pay. 154 The other option was thirty days in

jail. 155
This case exemplifies the difficult position code enforcement and
prosecuting attorneys can find themselves in when enforcing their local
code. 15 6 On one hand, the converted garage was not only constructed without
permits, it also did not meet the minimum requirements of the code, and
therefore posed a danger. 157 On the other hand, however, the violator in the

150. In Tulsa Oklahoma, Denise Morrison grew a garden with over one hundred plant varieties, all of
them edible for both food and medicinal purposes. Lori Fullbright, Woman Sues City of Tulsa for Cutting
Down Her Edible Garden, TULSA, OK - NEWS, WEATHER, VIDEO, SPORTS (June 15, 2012, 7:39 PM)

http://www.newson6.com/story/18802728/woman-sues-city-of-tulsa-for-cutting-down-her-edible-garden.
A
neighbor's complaint landed her and the city in court, and despite a court order continuing the matter, the city
cut down not only her garden, but several fruit- and nut-bearing trees as well. Id.
151.

David

Kelly,

Floored by

Code

Dispute, Los

ANGELES

TIMES

(Oct.

18,

2008)

http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/18/local/me-garagel 8.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. In addition to making a decision that best accomplishes the goals of code enforcement, the public
sentiment was that Carmago was the victim, and one attorney alleged that the city's actions amounted to elder
abuse. Id.
157. Id.
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case had no resources to tear down the room. 158 Fines or jail time would solve
nothing in this instance. Fortunately, in this instance, common sense prevailed
and an accord was reached, allowing Carmago to keep the garage intact if she
59
brought it up to code.'
If the purpose of municipalities having the power to enforce code
violations is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its communities, then
one must ask whether jailing those members of the community is
commensurate with that goal. One must also ask whether it is more or less safe
to tolerate a structure that has stood for decades but is technically not compliant
with the code, or bulldoze it and make its owners homeless. 160 Whether it is
from lack of resources, or a failure to use those resources wisely, in many
jurisdictions, this system is failing. Therefore, a new comprehensive and
strategic method must emerge to enable code enforcement agencies to
161
effectively and efficiently deal with the blight in our communities.
IV. SOLUTIONS

Before exploring different ideas to improve the current code enforcement
systems, it is important to note that as different as each community is across the
United States, the possible solutions to resolving problems also vary
immensely. The solutions proposed herein may be very useful for one
158. Id.
159. Grandma:"If lIt
Hadn't Beenfor Them, I'd Be in Jail," NBC SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (Jan. 26, 2009,

1:18 PM) http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Grandma-If-It-Hadnt-Been-for-Them-Id-Be-in-Jail.html.
Carmago has three years to remediate the issues with the garage that violate the local code. Id A local
contractor has agreed to help Carmago with the repairs, free of charge. Id.While this is a story with a happy
ending, it required the assistance of an attorney on behalf of Carmago and years of litigation, including a case
before the city council. Id. The national discussion on how code enforcement can better serve the community
and accomplish its goals must include a conversation on compromise, and enunciate the idea that the code
should be viewed as a shield and not a sword. The Carmago case is a prime example of a desirable result that
could have been achieved with less animosity and use of resources had the initial attitude from all sides been
one of cooperation.
Another important element of the Carmago case, which is addressed in more detail below, is the cost of
remediation. Id. In that case, Carmago had no ability to remediate theviolations. Id. Fortunately, in that case,
a local contractor agreed to do the work for free. Id.It would be naive to base a code enforcement system on
the community to do all of the work forfree, thus another important part of the discussion is how to allow
agencies themselves to complete the work and still have their costs recoverable, both legally and practically.
160. Another type of abuse of power exists where code enforcement agents use their position for personal
gain. See Jay Weaver, Miami Beach Code Enforcer at Center of FBI Nightclub Sting Pleads Guilty, MIAMI
HERALD (Aug. 6, 2012) http://www.miamiheraId.com/2012/08/06/2935489/miami-beach-code-enforcementboss.html; Steven Chaitman, Feds Nab Seven City Inspectors in Bribery Case, CHI TOWN DAILY NEWS (May
22, 2008, 8:53 PM) http://www.chitowndailynews.org/2008/05/22/Feds-nab-seven-city-inspectors-in-briberycase- 14709.html; Jim Smith & Dave Davies, Sex, Bribes and L&i Ex-InspectorIndicted FrankAntico Accused
of Shakedowns, Bribery and Extortion, PHILLY.COM (May 15, 1998) http://articles.philly.com/1998-0515/news/25740273_1_red-tape-city-inspector-grand-jury.
In any type of law enforcement, the opportunity
exists for the agent to overlook violations in exchange for money or favors. See id Code enforcement is no
different. Further, not only do code enforcement agents have the ability to overlook violations, but there are
also instances of targeted extortion. See id In Miami Beach, Florida, an investigation involving an FBI agent
posing as a club manager revealed that the lead code enforcement agent for Miami Beach had accepted over
sixteen thousand dollars in bribe money, after demanding money for "protection" from the city's inspections.
Weaver supra. The investigation revealed multiple inspectors involved in the extortion, and also exposed a
history of bribes and drug transportation within the department. Id.
161. Betts, supra note 15, at 22. For statistics on blight, see supra footnote 67.
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jurisdiction but ineffective or even counter-productive in another, because of
local politics, culture, and the existing legal framework. Despite these
differences, studying systems that have been successful may help a local
government craft a solution tailored to its particular needs. Below are examples
of a few legal tools that have been successful in various states and local
jurisdictions across the country. The first solution presented is granting
superlien status to code enforcement liens. The next solution presented is
enacting ordinances or statutes that allow for a health and safety receivership.
The final solution presented is a co-production model of code enforcement.
States and municipalities-along with their code enforcement agenciesshould examine these solutions and implement them locally, adjusting the
methods to suit the nature of their communities.
A. Creation of Superlien Status for Code Enforcement Liens
Creating super-priority for code enforcement liens is a legal tool that is
not being used in most states. This tool, however, has the potential to help solve
the problem of lack of resources in code enforcement departments. It also
motivates owners to action because they do not want the superlien to be
foreclosed.
The common law rule of "first in time, first in right" has been codified in
the majority of states through recording statutes. This idea, that earlier recorded
liens will have priority over later recorded liens, is uniform throughout the
country. There are exceptions to this, however, for a variety of liens,
including-among others-ad valorem tax liens as well as condominium and
homeowner association liens. These liens are commonly referred to as
"superliens." 162
Under a superlien regime, even if an ad valorem tax lien was created and
recorded subsequent to an earlier recorded purchase money mortgage lien, the
ad valorem tax lien would have priority. In times when residential mortgage
collateral exceeds the value of the mortgage on the property, lien priority is not
so important an issue because there is plenty of money to go around-all the
lienors get paid and the mortgagor may even get money back, too. When the
value of the home falls below the amount owed on the mortgage, however, lien
priority becomes much more important.
In the example of an ad valorem tax lien foreclosure sale, the ad valorem
tax lien will be paid in full before anything is paid to the remaining lienors
(including a purchase money mortgage). As one can imagine, the ability for a
lien to jump the order of priority and head to the front of the line is not
appreciated by lenders. Nonetheless, some state legislatures have made
exceptions to the first in time principle in cases where the benefits to the
162. They are also referred to as having "super-priority."
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community outweigh the potential risks to the lending markets. Without the
super-priority lien for ad valorem taxes, a local government would have a much
harder time recouping unpaid property taxes which are essential for providing
services such as schools and utilities.
If the overall mission of code enforcement is to keep communities safe
and clean, then superliens help achieve that goal in several ways. First, it is
more likely that the state will pursue remediation over sanctions if its costs are
recoverable. 163 Because the goal of code enforcement is to keep properties safe
and neighborhoods free of blight, remediation is always preferred over
punishment. More importantly, where there is no superlien statute in effect,
lenders will have little incentive to remediate a distressed property. The
absence of a superlien statute compels the state to bear the cost of repairing a
dangerous violation, and effectively makes the state's cost a windfall to the
lender because in an "underwater" property, the state will not recoup those
costs. 164 Where code enforcement agencies cannot or will not remediate
violations, and lenders have no incentive to act, properties remain neglected
and hazardous. 165 Because mortgage securitization has disconnected the
personal relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee, states must
incentivize a lender's participation in keeping properties compliant and
66
neighborhoods free of blight.1
Louisiana has established superlien priority throughout the state and its
municipalities for code enforcement liens. Municipalities may impose civil
fines for property that is blighted, abandoned, or otherwise poses a danger to
the public because of code violations. 167
A separate statute grants
municipalities the authority to remove unsanitary weeds and growth from a
property and the sidewalks around it. 168 Most importantly, municipalities have
a lien for any maintenance, removal, or demolition it conducts on a derelict
property. 169 The Louisiana legislature reiterated the superiority of all of these
163. Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental Superliens and the Problem
Securitization, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 158 (2002).

of Mortgage-Backed

164. Id. This is because, as ajunior lien, the code enforcement lien will be eliminated through foreclosure
as to its in rem remedy; the in personam remedy would not be against the lender, but rather the homeowner,
who islikely insolvent.
165. The problem is exacerbated by lenders' lack of diligence in prosecuting active foreclosures. While
a property is in foreclosure, its lender has little incentive to remediate violations, absent a superlien statute.
Once the lender takes possession, code enforcement can then levy fines directly against the lender as owner.
166. Lind, supra note 127, at 447. It is the securitization of mortgages that has destroyed the traditional
connection between mortgagor and mortgagee. Id Rather than the borrower and the lender engaged in a
personal and mutual economic relationship, lenders today rarely keep loans they originate and the tasks of
collecting payments are assigned to servicers. Id at 447-448. This absence of personal interest from lenders
in properties fuels an apathy towards their conditions and a lack of concern for the community in general. Id.
167. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:2575 (2013). The statute distinguishes between municipalities with more
or less than seventy thousand people. Id. For those under seventy thousand, code violations do not qualify as
instances where fines would apply. Id.
168. Id. § 33:5062.
169. Id.
§ 33:4766.
A. The parish or municipality has a privilege and lien upon an immovable and its improvements,
and the owner is personally liable for:
(1) The cost to the parish or municipality of maintenance of the immovable or improvements; and
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liens in the statute regarding lien priority. 170 The result is that municipalities
in Louisiana can undertake remediation of blighted properties with the
confidence that they can recover their costs. As a result, since 2010, the city of
New Orleans has reduced blight by thirty percent, and it has recovered $3.4
17
million through the lien foreclosure process. 1
As noted above, Louisiana has explicitly established superlien status for
172
code enforcement liens, or explicitly authorized municipalities to do so.
Other states have chosen to prioritize code enforcement liens as any other lien
on real property. 173 Still other states, however, have not explicitly legislated
whether municipalities may establish code enforcement liens as having superpriority to other liens. A recent opinion from the Florida Supreme Court
highlighted this ambiguous situation.
In City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 174 the Florida Supreme
Court was called upon to address whether Palm Bay, a municipality in the state
of Florida, was permitted to enact local legislation that established its municipal
code enforcement liens as having super-priority status.
In Florida, municipalities are granted the right to enforce their code by
Florida Statute Chapter 162.175 That provision establishes code enforcement
boards and a procedure by which they may lien properties. 176 Additionally, the
Florida Constitution grants municipalities governmental, corporate, and
proprietary powers to allow them to operate as a municipality.' 7 7 Finally,
Florida Statute 166.021(1), in reference to the Florida Constitution, reiterates
municipalities' home rule powers, stating that they "may exercise any power
178
for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law."
The Florida Supreme Court looked to three Florida statutes that address
lien priority in holding Palm Bay's ordinance invalid. 17 9 Two of the statutes
(2) The cost to the parish or municipality of demolishing or removing, or both, a building or other
structure situated upon the immovable or improvements, and all attorney fees incurred by the parish
or municipality in connection with such demolition or removal.
Id.
170. See id § 9:4821. "The privileges granted by R.S. 9:4801 and 4802 rank among themselves and as to
other mortgages and privileges..." Id.
171. 2013 New Orleans Blight Reduction Report, NoLA.Gov, http://nola.gov/getattachment/Performanceand-Accountability/Initiatives-and-Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Reportweb.pdf/ (Jan. 2014). New Orleans

reduced blighted homes by ten thousand from 2010 to 2014. Id. Other jurisdictions with superliens for code
enforcement are: 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21.3 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-48-1 to 3-48-7 (1978); WIS. STAT.
§ 144.442 (1997).
172. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (2013).

173. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1370 (2014).
174.

114So. 3d 924 (Fla. 2013).

175. FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2014).
176. ld §§ 162.05-.06.
177. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) (2012) ("Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and
proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render
municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.").
178. FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1) (effective July 1,2011) unconstitutionalas applied by City of Miami Beach
v. Bd. of Trs. of the City Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in the City of Miami Beach, 91 So.
3d 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
179. City ofPalm Bay, 114 So. 3d at 928; FLA. STAT. §§ 28.222(2), 695.11,695.01(1) (2012).
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are recording statutes, which mandate the procedure that clerks of the court
must follow to record official records; the third requires that all official records
be recorded according to statute to be valid against subsequent creditors or
1 80
purchasers without notice.
The court found that the municipal ordinance conflicted with the recording
statutes. 18 1 The majority acknowledged that municipalities have the power to
legislate on any subject matter, so long as the municipal legislation did not
conflict with state law. 182 However, as noted in the dissent, such a conflict is
not the same as a situation where a municipal enactment has been expressly
preempted by state statute. That should have been the test applied by the
1 83
majority.
Florida, like many other states, was hit very hard by the housing market
crash and the ensuing foreclosure crisis, and there have been a record number
of abandoned and lender-owned properties in the state. 184 Unfortunately, the
Palm Bay case produced a result in which local governments are now blocked
from enacting superlien legislation, not because the state legislature has
expressly preempted it, but due to an opinion focused on statutes which are
"scattered and separately enacted." 185
One battle over superlien status took place in 1983 when Massachusetts
enacted a law that gave super-priority status to environmental liens. 186 Both
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and Federal National Mortgage
Association responded to the statute by threatening to stop purchasing singlefamily residence mortgages in Massachusetts. 187 The state responded by
188
exempting residential property from the superlien statute.
Mortgage lenders oppose superlien statutes due to the negative impact a
superior lien would have on its return in the event of a default and
foreclosure. 189 Additionally, the securitization of mortgages created a need
within that industry for uniformity across states; superlien statutes would
180. FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (2012) ("No conveyance, transfer, or mortgage of real property, or of any
interest therein ... shall be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for
a valuable consideration and without notice, unless the same be recorded according to law.").

181. City of Palm Bay, 114 So,3d at 931 (Perry, J., dissenting).
182. Id.The majority's logic is additionally flawed in that the state legislature has itself established
several exceptions to the lien priority schedule. The dissent points this out, stating, "Because the Legislature
has provided several exemptions to the 'first in time' rule, the City may likewise legislate such a rule under its

home rule authority." Id.
183. Id.
184. Mortgage Foreclosure, (last visited Nov. 3, 2014) http://www.flcourts.org/administrationfunding/court-funding-budget/mortgage-foreclosure.stml ("As of April 30, 2014, there were about 186,000

mortgage foreclosure cases pending in Florida courts.").
185. City of Pahn Bay, 114 So. 3d at 931 (Perry, J., dissenting).
186. Nash, supra note 163, at 129. Environmental liens differ from code enforcement liens in that the

former focus on contamination of real property from toxic materials, while the latter stem from violations of
local building codes. Id.
187. Id. at 129-130.

188. Id.
at 130.
189. Id.at 131. Lenders fear the "slippery slope" of superliens and the threat that they pose to the
"predictability that undergirds the residential mortgage lending industry." Id at 134. A few years later that

predictability was shattered by the lending practices of the industry itself. Id.
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190
destroy the certainty of the priority of their liens.
While tax liens enjoy superlien status in most states, those liens are
predictable and lenders are able to cover the risk of those superior liens within
the loans themselves. 19 1 The issue with environmental or code enforcement
superliens that apply retroactively is that they fail to give lenders the
opportunity to factor in the risk that a superlien will trump their mortgage,
consequently precluding the lender from adding a premium to the loan to offset
the risk. 192 One solution to this issue is for a state to only apply the superlien
1 93
statute to mortgages that are recorded after the statute is in effect.

The arguments against superliens-that their risk to lenders and
unpredictability would wreak havoc on the secondary market-are less
pertinent with regard to code enforcement liens. The stark difference between
liens for environmental cleanup and code enforcement liens is their respective
amounts. The cost for remediating soil contaminated with toxic materials is
vastly different than the cost of fixing a broken window or keeping a lawn
mowed. There are, of course, more serious violations that code enforcement
agencies face, including some so serious that total demolition is required. The
point, however, is that by and large the value of code enforcement liens do not
rise to the level of those for environmental cleanup, so the economic impact on
lenders is minimal in comparison. In the event a property is so dilapidated that
a code enforcement lien would strip some or all of the lender's equity, that
lender's bottom line will be impacted regardless of whether an agency or the
lender itself completes the repairs. 194 Allowing a code enforcement agency to
remediate repairs by protecting the state with a superlien for its costs
accomplishes the goal of removing blight from communities while minimizing
its impact on lenders and their security interests.
Granting superlien status to code enforcement liens is an effective solution
to fighting blight in communities. It creates an incentive to first mortgage
holders to take an active part in ensuring their collateral remains compliant with
the code. Additionally, in the instances where the interested parties refuse to
remediate violations, it protects the local government by ensuring its costs in
repair or demolition are reimbursed before all other lienholders. This protection
creates an incentive for local governments to act, resulting in less blight.
B. Health and Safety Receiverships
Another tool that states have used to accomplish the goals of code
enforcement is termed a health and safety receivership. California has a statute
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
how land

Id. at 131-132.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 168-169.
For a detailed analysis of the impact of properties that are so devalued that they are worthless and
banking has rejuventated certain cities, see generally Alexander, supra note 70.
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which allows any "enforcement agency, tenant, or tenant association or
organization" to seek a court order appointing a receiver for a property that
remains in violation of the code and poses a substantial danger to residents or
19 5
the public.
The procedure begins with a notice to repair or abate the code
violations. 196 The owner is given a reasonable time to comply.' 97 If the owner
fails to comply, then the enforcement agency has several remedies, including
98
seeking an order for the appointment of a receiver for the offending property. 1
California requires any receiver to first demonstrate "his or her capacity
and expertise to develop and supervise a viable financial and construction plan
for the satisfactory rehabilitation of the building."' 199 Upon appointment, the
receiver is given full control of the property and the power to act on behalf of
the property. 200 The receiver is then tasked with remediating the violations or
demolishing the building. 20 1 During the receivership, the owner of the property
20 2
is enjoined from collecting rents.
A problem arises for a receiver when the property in question has little or
negative equity due to existing liens. In those instances, there is a danger that
the receiver will have no source of income with which to pay the costs of
remediation, including the receiver's fee. Because the receiver's lien would be
prioritized behind the existing liens, it would hold no value. This is the same
problem code enforcement agencies face in collecting reimbursement of their
expenses, discussed above. While California does not have a universal
superlien statute for receivership liens, its courts have held that a receiver may
still obtain superlien status for liens associated with remediation of the subject
property. To do so, a receiver may petition the court to establish its lien as
having super-priority over existing liens, including purchase money mortgages.
Not only may a court establish the costs of restoration or demolition as a
superior lien, but also the receiver's fees and costs. 20 3 In deciding whether to
195.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17980.7, 17980.6 (2013). To qualify for a receiver, the statute

requires that a building contain violations that "are so extensive and of such a nature that the health and safety
of residents or the public is substantially endangered." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
§ 17980.7.
198. Id.
§ 17980.7(c).
199. Id.§ 17980.7(c)(2). The statute specifically allows nonprofit organizations or community
development corporations to serve as receivers. Id.
200. Id.17980.7(4). The receiver is granted the power to manage the building and pay expenses (4)(B),
to secure a cost estimate and construction plan from licensed contractors toremediate the violations (4)(C), to
employ licensed contractors (4)(D), to collect rents from the building and use the funds to remediate the
violations (4)(E)-(F), and with court approval, borrow and secure the debt with a lien on the subject property
(4)(G).

201. City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez, 182 P.3d 1027, 1045 (Cal. 2008). In Gonzalez, a receiver was
appointed for a residential building that had been in an unsafe condition for over fifteen years. Id. at 1030.
The receiver determined that the most profitable decision was, rather than repairing the building, to demolish
it and sell the property. Id.
at 1034. The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that
the facts supported the receiver's determination that demolition, rather than repair, was the proper course of
action. Id.
at 1046.
202.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 17980.7(3) (2013).

203. See generally, Schreiber v. Ditch Rd. Investors, 164 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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grant super-priority status to a receiver's lien, the main questions for the court
are whether existing lienholders have been afforded notice and the opportunity
to object, 20 4 and whether the receiver has been appointed to protect the interests
20 5
of the property.
California's Health and Safety Receivership model has two facets that
states can and should implement to aid code enforcement agencies in
discharging their duty. First, the receivership itself removes the burden of
remediation from code enforcement agencies and allows those agencies to
dedicate their resources to inspection and monitoring. Independent of the
receivership, California's method of establishing super-priority for its
receivership liens could be repurposed for code enforcement liens. The threepronged approach California courts use to determine whether to grant superpriority status for liens is one that balances the protection of lenders' mortgage
liens with the need to give code enforcement agencies the incentive to
remediate substandard properties and the ability to collect their costs from
doing so.
One way for states to borrow from California's approach is for them to
establish a procedure whereby code enforcement agencies could notice existing
lienholders of their intent to conduct remediation of code violations. The
existing lienholders could then either make the repairs themselves, or allow the
code enforcement agency to make them. Existing lienholders-particularly
those with a purchase money mortgage-would then have foreknowledge that
the code enforcement lien would receive super-priority status, while they are
still afforded an opportunity to remediate the violation themselves.
Additionally, the impact on first lienholders would be minimal, especially those
in foreclosure, since regardless of whether the lender spends money
remediating problems at a property (thereby reducing its bottom line) or code
enforcement's lien is given the first equity in the property, the net effect in
dollars is the same.
C. Co-ProductionModel
As discussed above, most states are still focusing on the person and not
the property when it comes to code enforcement. These states have code
enforcement models that use a deterrent enforcement strategy that attempts to
get residents to comply with the code out of fear of fines or other negative
government action. 20 6 One method that takes a different approach, however,
204. Id. The court stated that the lender consented to the appointment of the receiver, and only after the
receiver filed its final account did the lender object to the subordination of its lien. Id. The court held that such
an objection came too late, and upheld the super-priority of the receiver's lien. Id.
205. "But there can be no question of the right of the court to give priority to certificates issued to enable
the receiver to carry out the primary object of his appointment, viz., the care and preservation ofthe property."
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cal. Dev. Co., 152 P. 564, 566 (Cal. 1915).
206.
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has seen very positive results.
The "co-production model" has been successfully implemented by several
communities in Baltimore. 20 7 This model realizes that the people who are best
able to see the community problems and have the knowledge and ability to
implement sustainable solutions to these problems are the residents. The
residents, however, cannot do it alone. They still need help from the local
government agencies to achieve results that are comprehensive. They work
together through a community association to target the problem areas in the
community. The community association cleans and boards up abandoned
properties and keeps detailed evidence logs of drug dealing and drug use in the
neighborhood to prove that certain properties are in violation of the housing
code. However, the association must turn to the local police or the local
government administrative agency if the property owner fails to respond to the
community association. The court may impose fines on the property that force
the owner to action. The court may appoint the community association as a
receiver of the property so that the property can be maintained 20 8 and secured
until it is sold to a developer for rebuilding. If an abandoned property is not
being maintained because the owner is an elderly woman in a nursing home,
threats of fines from the local government agency will not abate the nuisance.
The inclusion of the community associations is therefore crucial to the solution
because the residents know each other and are better suited to advise the local
government agency of problem properties and coordinate a strategy for dealing
with each property individually.
"Code enforcement is, by its very nature, an interactive process dependent
on governmental systems such as inspections, government records, the court
20 9
system and system of follow-up to ensure compliance with a court order."
This coordination is essential to successful abatement and remediation, but it
rarely occurs where the government agency is the only actor involved. 2 10 One
great strength that the residents of a community can bring to the table is their
21
ability to monitor whether the court order is actually accomplished. 1
One obstacle to bringing the community associations into the mix of code
enforcement is their potential lack of standing to bring nuisance abatement
cases to court. Some states require that, in order to have standing, a community
association must own property. Community associations rarely own property,
however. There needs to be incremental legislative reform on this point to

ABATEMENT, CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES, VOL. 9 (1998) at 265.
207. Id.at 268; see also Report, DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK FORCE supra note i (stating that one

part of the plan to remove blight in Detroit calls for "[t]he Establishment of the Department of Neighborhoods,
providing the foundation for coordinating cross-agency actions and supporting much more consistent and
transparent communication between the city and its residents than ever before").
208. Id.
at 274.
209. Id. at 273.
210. See id.

211. Id.
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allow community associations standing to bring these types of suits. If they
have standing, these groups can target the problem properties and try non-legal
efforts to rehabilitate them. But if that fails, they can enlist the court system to
help tackle the distressed property.
In Baltimore, the community law center created a separate entity called
"Save a Neighborhood, Inc." ("SAN") 2 12 that procured the necessary funding
to have a lawyer and be the entity that was appointed as a receiver for the
abandoned properties. The SAN-type entity can watch the property and track
it through the entire process and ultimately have the property transferred to a
new owner who will responsibly maintain the property if the original owner
loses the property rights.
There are several case studies in Baltimore that show the successful use
of co-production models. They involve comprehensive strategies that were
implemented that produced tremendously positive results. For example, in the
small neighborhood of Boyd Booth the co-production model was used to
convert an open-air drug market neighborhood into one listed by the local press
as one of the safest neighborhoods in Baltimore. 2 13 The residents pooled their
resources to create this dramatic shift in their community.
They worked with a part-time organizer, a community attorney, a community
paralegal, the Southwestern Police Drug Enforcement Unit, a task force of city
agencies and surrounding community associations established by the mayor, the
Victory Outreach drug abuse treatment program 2 the largest employer in the
community (a hospital), and several local funders. 14

The community association, in addition to boarding up drug houses,
cleaning up the properties, and creating a "defensible space program," brought
the appropriate nuisance abatement cases to court. 215 The community also held
vigils, regularly used the public spaces for positive community events, and
established a youth program. This comprehensive plan by the residents,
working through the community association, resulted in a ninety percent drop
in narcotic-related calls for police service and arrests, and violent crime
dropped fifty-five percent. These statistics are impressive, but the real victory
is that the residents of this community now feel empowered and hopeful about
their neighborhood. A strong sense of community has replaced fear. The
residents see the government coming alongside them to help them reclaim their
neighborhood, and the once cynical view of the government has been replaced
2 16
with the view of a true partnership.
The co-production model is a potential solution that can address many of
the problems discussed in this Article. It has the ability to bring additional
revenue sources to the code enforcement efforts through the funding of the
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 274.
Id. at 282-283.
Id. at 282.
Id. at283.
Id. at 286.
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community associations by the local businesses. The co-production model also
decreases the workload for code enforcement staff because the community
association is sharing in the burden of some of the inspector duties, thereby
allowing the resources to last longer.
Moreover, the co-production model deals with the problem of lack of
prioritization in enforcing violations. The community association works with
the code enforcement department to strategically plan how to identify
violations, and how to monitor compliance so that the cases do not fall through
the cracks. In the case of Baltimore, the community association mapped out
the entire neighborhood and detailed specific dates as to when certain
2 17
enforcement actions or community clean up events would take place.
Finally, the co-production model can address the potential for abuse of
power in code enforcement. The code enforcement department works with the
community association to develop the best strategy to remove the blight in the
neighborhood while at the same time building up the community morale.
Because the community is involved, it greatly reduces the risk of a government
department acting with unchecked power. The community association's
intimate involvement in the enforcement of violations would prevent the
inspectors from turning to abusive scare tactics. The code enforcement
department gets the extra help and financial resources they need from the
community association, and the community gets a code enforcement
department that is listening to the community needs, and working with the
residents and not against them.
V. CONCLUSION

Code enforcement systems in the United States have not evolved quickly
enough to meet the changing needs of America's communities. Within the last
decade, financial disasters, like the housing market crash of 2008, and natural
disasters, like Hurricane Katrina, have impacted communities in ways not seen
in generations, if ever. As a result, even formerly effective code enforcement
systems have shown flaws in their ability to accomplish the goals those systems
were designed to meet.
Local governments are facing unprecedented numbers of abandoned
properties, and they lack the financial resources and legal tools to remove the
blight in their neighborhoods. At the same time, a handful of local governments
are abusing their power and have resorted to using code enforcement as a means
to overpower and intimidate citizens. If these problems go unchecked, there
will be even more cities like Detroit, where forty thousand homes are in need
of demolition and thousands more are in need of rehabilitation. Or there may
be an increase of areas like the Antelope Valley, where residents are harassed

217. Seeid.at282.
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and threatened at gunpoint with little recourse other than to vacate their homes.
Because blight spreads throughout a community like a virus, state and
local legislators need to take action to implement comprehensive code
enforcement strategies that attack the problems from multiple angles. The
creation of superlien status for code enforcement liens is one way to address
the problem of lack of resources because it gives priority of payment in the
event of a lien foreclosure, which is crucial when many homes are still valued
for less than their mortgage. The creation of health and safety receiverships is
one way to ensure code enforcement efforts focus on the property and not
individuals, which furthers the goal of remediation over punishment. These
receiverships accomplish this by streamlining the process for a receiver to take
possession of distressed properties. Finally, a co-production model would help
address lack of resources because the community partners help fund the
community clean-ups, the residents provide the man-power, and the code
enforcement agency relies on the community to assist in monitoring the
progress. The co-production model also helps prioritize code violation claims.
As opposed to relying on complaints to identify code violations, the community
and code enforcement team work together to create a strategic plan to target
areas in a comprehensive manner. The co-production model at its very core is
a model where the code enforcement agency works side by side with the
community to develop the community's code enforcement goals. Because this
model involves the community in each step of the process, it helps prevent a
code enforcement department abusing its power. These solutions have had
great success in a handful of states and communities, and they should be studied
and replicated extensively across the United States to help adapt code
enforcement systems to the new needs of our communities.

